

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 DPW-01 IO-12 SSO-00 NSCE-00

AID-20 SR-02 ORM-03 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09

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SS-15 RSR-01 /133 W

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O R 061040 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9757

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

USDEL JEC PARIS

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMCONSUL DANANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

AMCONSUL CAN THO

CINCPAC

CDRUSSAG NKP RTAFB

COMUSMACTHAI

USDAO SAIGON

USDEL FPJMT

C O N F I D E N T C T A L SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 5815

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT PINS MILI VS

SUBJECT: VIETNAM CEASEFIRE SITUATION REPORT- APRIL 6, 1973

THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE
TO THE EMBASSY AS OF 2000 APRIL 6.

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PART I INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (ICCS)
LONG PLENARY FAILS TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON TONG LE CHAN NON-

INVESTIGATION. ICCS SECRETARIAT EXPRESSES GRATITUDE FOR US ADMINISTRATIVE/ LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

PART II TWO PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (TPJMC): NO PROGRESS IN TPJMC ON TONG LE CHAN.

PART III HANOI BLASTS NIXON THIEU JOINT COMMUNIQUE

PART IV CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS: VIOLATIONS REACH 9905.

PART V MR 1: NLF RESETTLEMENT PROJECT IN UPPER SONG VE VALLEY.

PART VI MR 2: FIGHTING SHARPEST IN REGION IN SOME TIME.

PART VII MR 3: TONG LE CHAN TAKES 236 ROUNDS MIXED FIRE BUT NO GROUND ATTACK.

PART VIII MR 4: MILITARY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY REMAINS HIGH. ICCS REDEPLOYS OUT OF HONG NGU.

PART I: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (ICCS)

1. THE APRIL 5 ICCS PLENARY LASTED SEVEN AND A HALF HOURS WITH BITTER DEBATE ON ALL SUBJECT S. THE HUNGARIAN, CANADIAN AND POLISH AMBASSADOR WERE ABSENT.

2. THE FIRST SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION WERE TWO REGION VII INVESTIGATION REPORTS (7/28 AND 7/37 A) WHICH CONTAINED ONLY THE VIEWS OF CANDEL AND INDODEL. HUNGDEL CONTENTED THAT THE REPORTS COULD NOT RPT NOT BE FORWARDED TO THE JMC AS " DIFFERENT VIEWS" UNDER ARTICLE 3 (B), SINCE THEY WERE THE ONLY VIEWS PRESENTED AND THUS NOT RPT NOT " DIFFERENT." IN THE END, HOWEVER, THE REPORTS WERE FORWARDED AS " VIEWS" TO THE JMC.

3. NEXT TWO REPORTS FROM PHAN THIET (REGION IV) WERE CONSIDERED. THE FIRST WAS A CANADIAN STATEMENT ON WHY INVESTIGATION 4/7 WAS NOT RPT NOT CARRIED OUT. IT WAS FORWARDED TO THE JMC. THE SECOND WAS A REPORT ON AN INCIDENT AT LAC LAU WHICH HAD BEEN INVESTIGATED BY A SUB- REGIONAL TEAM
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WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING AUTHORIZATION FROM THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS. HUNGDEL AND POLDEL ARGUED THAT SINCE REGIONAL AUTHORIZATION HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN OBTAINED IN ADVANCE, THE REPORT WAS NOT RPT NOT CORRECT AND COULD NOT RPT NOT BE FORWARDED. CANDEL SAID IT HAD NEVER AGREED THAT INVESTIGATIONS COULD NOT RPT NOT BE CARRIED OUT BY SUB- REGIONAL TEAMS AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE AND THUS REJECTED THE HUNGARIAN/ POLISH CONTENTION. THE DOCUMENT WAS FINALLY SENT FORWARD AS AN

"OBSERVATION REPORT" TO THE JMC.

4. THE PLENARY THEN CONSIDERED 9 DOCUMENTS FROM DANANG (REGION II) WHICH CONCERNED REQUESTS FROM THE RVN FOR INVESTIGATION OF TWO ALLEGED CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. THE INVESTIGATIONS HAD NOT RPT NOT TAKEN PLACE AS HUNGDEL AND POLDEL ARGUED THAT SUCH REQUESTS HAD TO GO TO JMC FIRST. IN AN APPARENT LAPSE BY POLDEL AND HUNGDEL (CANDEL SUGGESTS THEY MAY NOT RPT NOT HAVE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS HAPPENING), THE PLENARY ORDERED REGION II TO CARRY OUT THE INVESTIGATIONS AND IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED DANANG FOR HAVING RAISED THE MATTER AT ALL.

5. THE FINAL SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WAS THE TONG LE CHAN NON-INVESTIGATION. AMBASSADOR DHARSONO' S CALLS ON THE RVN AND PRG JMC REPRESENTATIVES HAD NOT RPT NOT ELICITED ANY CHANGES IN PREVIOUS TPJMC POSITIONS. HUNGDEL (URANOVICZ) ARGUED LONG AND HARD THAT THE ICCS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT REALLY BE CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS ANYWAY. IT SHOULD BE AIDING THE PARTIES TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE. HE THEN READ A LONG PAPER OUTLINING ALLEGED RVN CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IN THE TONG LE CHAN AREA WHICH CAUSED CANDEL TO REMARK THAT HUNGDEL HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CARRYING OUT ITS OWN PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS (THE PAPER WAS OBVIOUSLY A PRG BROADSIDE). THE PLENARY THEN DECIDED TO ADOPT ITS FAVORITE SOLUTION TO INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS, I. E., THE DISPATCH OF A LETTER TO THE JMC. THE CHAIRMAN (INDODEL), AFTER AN INTERMISSION, PRESENTED A DRAFT TEXT WHICH CALLED FOR DESIGNATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS, A LOCAL CEASEFIRE AND THE APPOINTMENT OF HIGH- LEVEL OFFICERS TO ESTABLISH THE MODALITIES OF THE CEASEFIRE AND ESUPPLY OF BASES SUCH AS TONG LE CHAN. CANDEL THOUGHT THE DRAFT WENT TOO FAR IN PLACING THE ICCS IN THE POSITION OF STIPULATING TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES THE SPECIFICS OF HOW THEY SHOULD CARRY OUT THE CEASEFIRE. THIS THEY CONTENTED WAS THE CONFIDENTIAL

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JOB OF THE JMC, NOT RPT NOT THE ICCS. THE CHAIRMAN WAS SUPPORTED BY HUNGDEL AND POLDEL. NO TEXT WAS AGREED TO, THEREFORE, AND THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED. IN SHORT, THE ICCS FAILED AGAIN TO MOVE THE TONG LE CHAN PROBLEM FORWARD IN ANY MEASURES IN DISCUSSION FOLLOWING DAY WITH POLDEL, LATTER ACCUSED CANDEL OF OBSTRUCTIONISM IN HAVING REFUSED HAND LETTER TO UJMC AND REFUSING TO MAKE EFFORT TO BRING PARTIES TOGETHER

6. CANDEL TOLD US ON APR. 06 THAT ITS TEAM WHICH HAD BEEN STUDYING PROCEDURES FOR POINT OF ENTRY RDS HAD RETURNED TO SAIGON. THEY REPORTED PDRT, THROUGH NEITHER THE RVF NOR THE ICCS HAD DEFINITIVE INSTRUCTION TO THE SITUATION AT DANANG WAS EXCELLENT. THE GVN PORT AUTHORITIES WERE COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. THEY GAVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF WAR MATERIAL ARRIVED TO OIC ICCS. THEY GAVE COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION TO THE ICCS. THEY ALLOWED FULL FREEDOM OF THE PORT AND

ICCS COULD MAKE SPOT CHECKS WHEN EVER IT WISHED.

7. IN COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR WHITEHOUSE, SECRETARIAT DIRECTOR GENERAL EFFENDI NUR EXPRESSED IN BEHALF OF ICCS GRATITUDE FOR US ADMINISTRATIVE/ LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED DURING INITIAL PERIOD.

PART II: TWO PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (TPJMC)

1. THE TPJMC MET FRIDAY, APR. 6, WITH EACH SIDE AGAIN REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF DELEGATION. GVN PRESS SPOKESMAN HIEN INDICATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE PRG AT VARIOUS POINTS RAISED NEW TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION, THE RVN DELEGATION MAINTAINED ITS POSITION THAT PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS MUST DEPEND ON SERIOUS HEADWAY ON THE TONG LE CHAN ISSUE. JUDGING FROM HIEN' S DESCRIPTION THE MEETING, WHICH BEGAN AT 1000 HOURS AND BROKE OFF AT 1245, WAS AN ACRIMTIOUS AND UNPRODUCTIVE SESSION.

2. SOME MATTER OF SUBSTANCE WERE DISCUSSED, HOWEVER. THE PRG, WHICH WAS PRESIDING TODAY, LED OFF WITH A PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT APPEAL TO THE TWO PARTIES, REPORTEDLY TO COVER ALL FIGHTING STILL GOING ON IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO HIEN, THE RVN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE COMMUNIST PROPOSAL, DECLARING ITSELF PREPARED
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TO DISCUSS IN FURTHER ONCE A DRAFT HAD BEEN PREPARED, BUT REITERATED THAT NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THIS GENERAL PROPOSAL UNTIL THERE WAS SOME SATISFACTORY PROGRESS ON THE SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF TONG LE CHAN. PRG ALSO BROUGHT UP THE ISSUE OF CIVILIAN DETAINEES AND THE REMAINING POW' S ON BOTH SIDES, AND BOTH SIDES REPORTEDLY AGREED TO REFER THESE MATTERS

TO THE APPROPRIATE SUB- COMMITTEES.

3. WITH RESPECT TO TONG LE CHAN, THE GVN CONFIRMED THAT A PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE TO THE PRG THAT COMMUNIST FORCES BE PULLED BACK 4 KILO- METERS FROM THE BESEIGED BASE. THAT DISTANCE, HIEN ADDED, DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY KIND OF BOUNDARY OF GVN- ENEMY CONTROLLED

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O R 061040 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9758

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

USDEL JEC PARIS

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMCONSUL DANANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

AMCONSUL CAN THO

CINCPAC

CDRUSSAG NKP RTAFB

COMUSMACTHAI

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (T E X T)

AREAS, BUT RATHER MARKS THE AREA IN WHICH, PRIOR TO THE
ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE CAMP, ARVN COULD OPERATE WITH IMPUNITY. MORE
SIGNIFICANTLY, PERHAPS, IT MARKS THE DISTANCE WHICH ACCORDING TO
HIEN IS NECESSARY TO HAVE UNDER SECURE CONTROL FOR MEDICAL
EVACUATION AND RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT TO OPERATE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION
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THAT THE PRG HAD REPLIED TO THIS PROPOSAL.

PART III: HANOI BLASTS NIXON- THIEU JOINT COMMUNIQUE

HANOI'S OFFICIAL MOUTHPIECE, THE PARTY NEWSPAPER NHAN DAN,
CLAIMED IN ITS APR. 6 EDITORIAL THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON
PRESIDENT THIEU'S SAN CLEMENTE VISIT WAS A "NEW PROOF" OF CONTINUED
US INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND OF THIEU'S SUBSERVIENCE. QUITE
ASIDE FROM ITS SUBSTANCE, THE COMMUNIQUE ITSELF IS A "VIOLATION"
OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, SAID NHAN DAN. THE EDITORIAL AVERRED THAT
THIEU'S REFERENCE TO HIS DETERMINATION TO INSURE SOCIAL AND

POLITICAL JUSTICE IN SVN HAD BEEN URGED ON HIM BY PRESIDENT NIXON WHO WANTED TO " REASSURE" THE US PUBLIC THAT THIEU WAS NOT A DICTATOR. NHAN DAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIEU' S " BOASTFUL STATEMENTS" DO NOT MATCH THE ACTS BY THE US AND GVN. NHAN DAN CALLED THE COMMUNIQUE' S REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE US/ GVN RETALIATION AGAINST CONTINUING INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH " THREAT FULL OF DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES."

PART IV: CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

OFFICIAL VIETNAM PRESS (VP) APRIL 6 PM CHARGED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE COMMITTED 9905 CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS AS OF 0600 APRIL 6. ENEMY CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED AS 16,905 KIA, AND 209 CAPTURED. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 3569 KIA, 17,270 WIA AND 960 MIA. IN ADDITION 524 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED, 1476 WOUNDED AND 970 ABDUCTED.

PART V: MR 1

1. ACTIVITY REMAINED CENTERED IN THE THIRD REGIMENT AREA OF THE FIRST DIVISION AO NORTHWEST AND WEST OF HUE. OF 25 INCIDENTS REPORTED THROUGHOUT THE REGION (21 ABF' S, 1 GROUND ATTACK, 3 MISCELLANEOUS), 16 WERE IN THE FIRST DIVISION AREA (15 ABF' S, 1 GROUND ATTACK). REGION WIDE CASUALTIES WERE: FRIENDLY 7 KIA, 32 WIA, 3 MIA; ENEMY 19 KIA. FRIENDLY ARTILLERY FIRED 1,595 ROUNDS 1,168 NORTH OF THE HAI VAN PASS, 427 SOUTH. MOST ENEMY MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS CONTINUE TO AVOID CONTACT AS THEY REGROUP AND RETRAIN FOLLOWING THEIR OFFENSIVE F LATE JANUARY.

2. ARVN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT THERE ARE NOW 4 SAM
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MISSILE SITES, 6 MISSILES, AND 4 RADAR SITES VISIBLE IN THE KHE SANH AREA.

3. IN CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF IN HUE, ICCS REGION I POLISH INTERPRETER MARIUSZ DASTYCH COMMENTED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET THE PRG TO TAKE REASONABLE POSITIONS. THE PRG OFTEN DOES " STUPID THINGS", HE SAID, WHICH MAKE IT EMBARRASSING FOR THE HUNGARIANS AND POLES TO SUPPORT THEM. DASTYCH GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THE FAILURE TO REMOVE DRV FLAGS FROM THE VINH HOA PHUONG AREA BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE ICCS/ JMC INVESTIGATING TEAM. DASTYCH COMMENTED: " EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THERE ARE NVA FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM BUT THEY SHOULD AT LEAST, FOR THE SAKE OF AN INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY THE PRG, PRESERVE THE FICTION THAT THE AREA BELOW THE CUA VIET RIVER IS PRG AND NOT DRV- CONTROLLED." IN DEFENSE OF THE PRG, DASTYCH STATED THAT IN SOME CASES DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN REGARDS INVESTIGATIONS AND DEPLOYMENT WHICH THE CANADIANS AND INDONESIANS DISMISS AS OBSTRUCTIVE TACTICS BUT ARE, IN FACT,

THE GENUINE RESULT OF INADEQUATE PRG RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES. (POLOFF COMMENT: INTERPRETER DASTYCH IS A FOREIGN
MINISTRY OFFICIAL
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AID-20 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

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O R 061040 Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9759
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36 OF ITS 53 VILLAGES ON MAY 27 (17 VILLAGES) AND JUNE 24 (19
VILLAGES).

PART VII: MR III

1. BETWEEN 0800 AND 2230 APR. 5 TONG LE CHAN BASE CAMP
RECEIVED 236 ROUNDS OF ASSORTED MORTAR, ROCKETS, HOWITZER AND
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B-40 GRENADES. FOUR ARVN RANGERS WERE WOUNDED. THERE WAS NO GROUND ATTACK. VC/ NVA ACTIVITY SLACKENED IN PHUOC LONG PROVINCE. VC/ NVA ACTIVITY WAS STEPPED UP IN TAY NINH PROVINCE ON APR. 5. THREE ATTACKS BY FIRE (ABF) OF OVER 20 ROUNDS, AND THREE GROUND ATTACKS WERE REPORTED. TWO LIGHT HARASSING GROUND PROBES WERE REPORTED IN HAU NGHIA AND PHUOC TUY PROVINCES. ELSEWHEREIN MR III THERE WAS NO HOSTILE ACTIVITY REPORTED.

2. THERE IS MORE VC GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN NHON TRACH AND LONG THAN DISTRICTS, SOUTHERN BIEN HOA PROVINCE.

3. THE BIEN HOA PROVINCE CHIEF, COL. CHINH, ONE OF THE ABLEST IN MR III, TOLD THE INTERPROVINCE REPRESENTATIVE APR. 5 THAT HE IS CONCENTRATING HEAVILY ON THE VILLAGE ELECTIONS, WHICH WILL BE HELD IN 41 OF BIEN HOA'S 65 ACTIVE VILLAGES IN MAY AND JUNE. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT DEMOCRACY PARTY CANDIDATES WOULD SWEEP THE BOARDS, AND THAT EVEN IF THE FREEDOM PARTY AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE MOUNTED CAMPAIGNS, THEY COULD ACCOMPLISH LITTLE OR NOTHING.

4. BINH LONG PROVINCE OFFICIALS ORGANIZED A " DAY OF SHAME" CELEBRATION ON APR. 5 AT THE PHU VAN REFUGEE CAMP IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE COMMEMORATING THE NVA ATTACK ON AN LOC. OVER 5000 PEOPLE ATTENDED. PETITIONS WERE PRESENTED TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF (FOR PRESIDENT THIEU) AND TO ICCS REPRESENTATIVES (ONLY CANADIANS AND INDONESIANS ATTENDED), ASKING THAT HIGHWAY 13 TO AN LOC BE REOPENED TO PERMIT THE REGUGEES' RETURN.

5. RURAL DEVELOPMENT CADRES (RDC) IN HOC MON DISTRICT OF GIA DINH PROVINCE ARE BEING FORCED TO RECRUIT FOR THE DEMOCRACY PARTY. CONGEN BELIEVES THAT QUOTAS HAPE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE RDC BECAUSE MANY PEOPLE WHOM THE CADRES HAVE PUT ON THE ROLLS AS DEMOCRACY PARTY MEMBERS DO NOT EVEN KNOW THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ENLISTED.

PART VIII MR 4

1. MILITARY ACTIVITY CONTINUED AT A FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL IN KIEN PHONNG AND DINH TUONG AND THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN CHUONG THIEN ON APRIL 5. FORTY- TWO OF THE 57 ENEMY INITIATED INCIDNETS REPORTED FOR APR. 5 OCCURRED IN THOSE THREE PROVINCES. MR IV REPORTED 11 ATTACKS BY FIRE (ABF) AND ONE GROUND ATTACK IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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HONG NGU AREA AS THE VC/ NVA CONTINUE TO EXERT PRESSURE ON GVN FORCES THERE. DINH TUONG REPORTED 12 ABF AND FOUR GROUND ATTACKS. CHUONG THIEN REPORTED SEVEN ABF, FOUR GROUND ATTACKS, AND THREE INFILTRATION INCIDENTS. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 26 KIA, 125 WIA, AND 6 MIA. ENEMY CASUALTIES REPORTED WERE 121 KIA. THE REST OF THE DELTA REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET WITH ONLY SMALL SCALE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

2. THE HONG NGU ICCS TEAM REDEPLOYED TO CAO LANH, THE KIEN PHONG PROVINCE CAPITAL, APR. 5 ON ORDERS FROM MG MCALPINE, SENIOR CANDEL MILITARY ADVISOR. AT THE TIME THE ICCS REDEPLOYED, HONG NGU HAD BEEN UNDER NVA ROCKET ATTACK FOR SEVERAL HOURS AND GROUND PROBES WERE REPORTED NEAR THE TOWN. THERE WAS FEAR AT ICCS REGION VI THAT A MAJOR VC/ NVA ATTEMPT TO TAKE THE TOWN WAS AFOOT. MG NGHI, MR IV COMMANDER, TOLD ICCS AND CONSULATE GENERAL OFFICERS APR. 5 THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THE TOWN WOULD HOLD IF ATTACKED. HE OFFERED TO BUILD BUNKERS FOR THE ICCS TEAM THERE.

3. REFUGEES: A FILIPINO USAID REFUGEE AFFAIR EMPLOYEE VISITED HONG NGU APR. 3 AND REPORTED THE FOLLOWING: THE NVA ATTACKED THUONG PHUOC VILLAGE, HONG NGU DISTRICT MAR. 20. APPROXIMATELY 2500 RESIDENTS FLED TO TAN CHAU, CHAU DOC PROVINCE WHERE THEY REMAIN. THE NVA ATTACKED THUONG LAC VILLAGE, HONG NGUE DISTRICT APR 22, OCCUPYING THREE HAMLETS. THE 5500 RESIDENTS FLED INTO THE SECURE AREA ACROSS THE MEKONG AND DOWN RIVER FROM HONG NGU DISTRICT TOWN. THE GVN HAS NOT REPORTED THE EXISTENCE OF THESE REFUGEES, AND NO EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO CARE FOR THEM. SECTOR OFFICIALS MAY NOT WANT TO ADMIT THE LOSS OF THE HAMLETS IN VIEW OF GVN ORDERS NOT TO GIVE UP TERRITORY.

4. RVNAF RECENTLY CAPTURED TWO IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS, PROBABLY DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT COSVN RESOLUTION #2, IN VC SOC TRANG PROVINCE. THEY INDICATE THAT VIET CONG INTENTIONS DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1973 EMPHASIZE THE CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES. TOP PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO PURGING VC AREAS OF GVN MILITARY PRESENCE, REPRESENTED BY RF/ PF OUTPOSTS AND PSDF. FOLLOWING THIS FIRST STEP, THE VC ARE TO REPOPULATE, DEVELOP, AND DEFEND THESE COMPLETELY LIBERATED ISLANDS THROUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMBAT HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. CONGEN COMMENTS BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROGRAMS AND GOALS ESTABLISHED IN THE DOCUMENTS, CONFIDENTIAL

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PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH RECRUITMENT, ARE GROSSLY UNREALISTIC (FOR FURTHER DETAILS SEE SEPT E L).

5. A LEADING BAC LIEU CAMBODIAN MONK WAS MURDERED ON APR. 3. THE SAME DAY A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION WAS GRENADED WITH FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE. FOR THE MOMENT LOCAL CAMBODIANS ARE BLAMING THE GVN FOR THE INCIDENTS (SEE SEPT E L). WHITEHOUSE

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CINCPAC
CDRUSSAG G NKP RTAFB
COMUSMACTHAI
USDAO SAIGON
FPJMT

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